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I. INTRODUCTION
I suspect that most American lawyers and law students regard
express warranty as neither more nor less than a term in a contract, a
term that is subject to conventional contract rules on formation,
interpretation, and remedy. Assume, for example, that a buyer sends a
purchase order to a seller and the purchase order specifies the delivery
of 300 tons of "prime Thomas cold rolled steel." The
acknowledgment also describes the goods to be sold as "prime
Thomas cold rolled steel." Every American lawyer would agree that
there is a contract to deliver such steel and furthermore would
conclude that the seller makes an express warranty that the steel
delivered would conform to that description and that the seller would
be liable for breach of its contract if it failed to deliver steel that
conformed to that description. So we would say that the description is
an express warranty and that the express warranty is neither more nor
less than a term in a contract.
But section 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code on express
warranty has language that fits only uncomfortably with that "contract
term" analysis. Section 2-313(1)(b) reads: "Any description of the
goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the description." If this term
"prime Thomas cold rolled steel" is merely a term in a contract, then
* Robert A. Sullivan Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I
acknowledge the extraordinary assistance of Christopher W. Campbell '99 and of Rozona
Kelemen.
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why is there an additional requirement that the term be "part of the
basis of the bargain," and why does similar language appear with
respect to "promises" in 2-313(1)(a), and with respect to "samples and
models" in 2-313(1)(c)? Normal rules of contract interpretation
provide that one is bound by terms of the contract-at least where he
has acknowledged his assent by signing-whether or not he has read
the contract, whether or not he knows what it says, and whether or not
he has relied. Assume that you promise to pay me in a fixed number
of deutschemarks instead of dollars. Assume that at the time of
contracting I was indifferent to the mode of payment and failed to
notice the deutschemark determination. I could still require you to pay
in deutschemarks, and I could enjoy the benefits of an appreciation of
deutschemarks against dollars that occurred since the signing even
though I had not relied on that term. Even if I would have preferred a
contract to buy in dollars, I could still insist on deutschemarks.
The basis of the bargain language that now appears in 2-313 is a
vestige of "warranty law." Warranty law started as tort but
progressively, from sometime in the nineteenth century, has moved
step-by-step from tort to contract.' Those steps were hastened by the
adoption of the Uniform Sales Act in many states in the twentieth
century' and accelerated by the post-war adoption of section 2-313 of
the UCC by each state except for Louisiana. The promulgation and
adoption of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (CISG) may be regarded as the last step in
the move to contract, for it abandons the last vestige of tort and self-
consciously makes express warranty into contract and nothing more.
Whether and to what extent the revised Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code should follow the CISG is the subject of current
debate.
II A SHORT REViEW oFTENTET CENTU YEXPRESS WARRANTY
LAW iN THE UNnrED STATS
At the request of the Commissioners for Uniform State Laws,
Professor Samuel Williston drafted an "Act to Make Uniform the Law
I. See SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON
LAw AND UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES AcT 251 (1909).
2. At its high point, the Uniform Sales Act (1906) was adopted in more than thirty
states. See LAWRENCE VOLD, HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OF SALES 6 n.33 (2d ed. 1959).
3. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
opened for signature April 11, 1980, art. 35, 19 I.L.M. 668, 679 (ratified by United States
December 11, 1986, effective January 1, 1988) [hereinafter C.I.S.G.].
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of Sales" in 1902 and 1903.4 In 1909, he published a one-volume
treatise on the law of sales that dealt not only with the English and
American case law of the day but also with the new act that he had
drafted-an act that was ultimately adopted as the Uniform Sales Act
in more than thirty states. Professor Williston commenced his
discussion of warranty with an ominous warning: "[here is no more
troublesome word in the law than the word warranty."5 He noted the
irony that, under English and some American cases, warranties were
traditionally regarded as "collateral, 6 namely that even an express
warranty was to be distinguished from and was different from other
promises in a contract for the sale of goods. He then described the
status of express warranty in 1909:
Section 197. Nature of the obligation of warranty. Much of the
intrinsic difficulty and still more of the divergence of authority which
characterize the law of warranty are due to an imperfect recognition of
the nature of the obligation imposed by a warranty. As has been seen,
the action upon a warranty was in its origin a pure action of tort. There
is no doubt that today the obligation of a warrantor is generally
conceived of as contractual, and there can be no doubt also that a seller
may expressly promise to be answerable for some alleged quality of the
articles sold, or that if he makes such a promise for good consideration
he enters into a contract. This, however, does not either upon authority
or reason exhaust the possibilities of express warranties. It should not
be the law, and by the weight of modem authority, it is not the law that
a seller who by positive affirmation induces a buyer to enter into a
bargain can escape from liability by denying that his affirmation was an
offer to contract. A positive representation of fact is enough to render
him liable. The distinction between warranty and representation which
is important in some branches of the law is not appropriate here. The
representation of fact which induces a bargain is a warranty. As an
actual agreement to contract is not essential the obligation of the seller
in such a case is one imposed by law as distinguished from one
voluntarily assumed. It may be called an obligation either on a quasi-
contract or a quasi-tort, because remedies appropriate to contract and
also to tort are applicable. That this is the character of the seller's
obligation was recognized by Blackstone, and that this point of view
has been lost sight of by some courts is no doubt due to the fact that
assumpsit became so generally the remedy for the enforcement of a
warranty. But even at the present time an action of tort for warranty
still lies irrespective of any fraud on the part of the seller or knowledge
4. See WLSTON, supra note 1, at iii.
5. Id. at 222.
6. Id. at 223.
1998] 2091
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on his 7part that the representations constituting the warranty were
untrue.
Consider the various attributes of warranty which in 1909 were in
one way or another associated with tort. First is the question of
whether the seller's intent is important. Intent might be important if
the cause of action were thought to be an intentional tort. Presumably
in that case one who made an inaccurate or erroneous statement by
mistake or through negligence might not be liable. Traditional
warranty reached beyond conventional contract. The need to
distinguish between actionable statements and a seller's "mere
opinion" tells that we are talking about something different from
contract, for who expresses an "opinion" in a contract?
Moreover, many of these warranty statements are made in a
different medium, at a different time, or a different place than the
medium, time, and place of the contract itself. This removal, temporal
and otherwise, from the events or the data that we normally
characterize as the "agreement" or the "contract," also shows the tort
ancestry.
Presumably, tort also brings the reliance requirement-the
precursor to the "basis of the bargain." If one regards express
warranty as a first cousin of the tort of deceit (being the same but
without the requirement of mens rea), then reliance may be regarded
as a fitting condition to liability where there is no contract liability.
Indeed, the Uniform Sales Act drafted by Williston made reliance a
condition to express warranty recovery.8
7. Ma at 250-52 (footnotes omitted).
8. Professor Williston wrote:
Section 206. Reliance of the buyer. As it is essential to maintain the action of
deceit that the plaintiff should have relied, to his injury, on the false statements
complained of, and as it is necessary in assumpsit that the plaintiff should have
done some act in reliance upon the offer, so it was an early requirement of the law
of warranty that the buyer should have relied on the warranty. The cases in which
the principle was first brought out relate to statements in regard to goods which
were obviously defective, especially horses with defective eyes. In an early case,
Brian, C.1, said: "If a man sells me a horse and warrants that he has two eyes, if
he has not, I shall not have an action of deceit, as I could know this at the
beginning." This was repeated in later cases and the point of the remark was
brought out by a later discrimination, "and the distinction is taken where I sell a
horse that has no eye, there no action lies; otherwise where he has a counterfeit,
false, and bright eye." It is evident, however, that a buyer might rely on a seller's
statement and be deceived even though he could have found out the truth by
careful inspection and this was recognized before long. There is danger of giving
greater effect to the requirement of reliance than it is entitled to. It is, of course,
true that the warranty need not be the sole inducement to the buyer to purchase the
goods. And as in assumpsit, as a general rule no evidence of reliance by the buyer
is necessary other than that the seller's statements were of a kind which naturally
HeinOnline  -- 72 Tul. L. Rev. 2092 1997-1998
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The defenses to liability-such as no liability for obvious or
known defects, no liability for faults shown by inspection-may also
survive from tort.9 Consider how awkward such a defense would be in
a true contract case: If I promise that X is so and you contract with me
believing that X is not so, conceivably damages for breach of the
contract are reduced because of your knowledge or suspicion, but it
seems inappropriate for me to say "I promised that X is so, but I have
no liability for breach of contract because you, my contracting party,
knew or suspected that X was not so."
Some forms of liability were also eliminated by the tort theory. It
is common for someone to promise a future event by executory
contract, but it would be uncommon to assign tortious liability to a
seller for a defect that did not exist at the time of the sale. Typically,
warranty speaks to the status of the goods at the time the statement is
made or at the time the sale occurs. It is not a promise about the
behavior of the goods thereafter-except insofar as deficiency in
performance shows that the warranty was breached. 10
What does the parol evidence rule tell? If express warranty were
merely contract, the rule would apply with all its force to express
warranties. Professor Williston dealt with this question in 1909:
Another principle which has not yet been very clearly brought out by
the cases should be clear wherever it is recognized that an affirmation
or representation may form the basis of liability in warranty even
though there is no intent to warrant, and the representations cannot
fairly be construed as an offer to contract. The basis of the parol
evidence rule is that it must be assumed that when parties contracted in
regard to a certain matter and reduced their agreement to writing, the
writing expressed their whole agreement in regard to that matter. This
reason is obviously inapplicable to a situation where an obligation is
imposed by law irrespective of any intention to contract. Therefore, if a
buyer is induced by positive statements of fact to enter into a written
contract for the purchase of goods, there seems no reason why these
statements should not be admitted in evidence. False and fraudulent
statements inducing the formation of a written contract may, of course,
would induce the buyer to purchase the goods and that he did purchase the goods.
The difficulties which arise in regard to questions of reliance relate to several
special cases which may be classified under four headings, as follows: 1. obvious
or known defects; 2. inspection; 3. statements made previously to the bargain;
4. statements made subsequent to the bargain.
9. These defenses appear in one form or another in the CISG and in the various
versions of Article 2. See C.I.S.G. art. 35; U.C.C. § 2-316 (1995); Revision of Uniform
Commercial Code Article 2-Sales, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, Draft of March 1, 1998, § 2-403 [hereinafter Draft of March 1, 1998].
10. See W.LuSrON, supra note 1, at 227.
1998] 2093
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be proved and if a false but honest statement, inducing the buyer to
enter into the bargain, renders the seller liable though he does not intend
to contract, there seems every reason for admitting evidence of such
statements in spite of the fact that the bargain was reduced to writing.
To understand how a lawyer from the eighteenth or nineteenth
century might think of warranty, consider an early English case cited
by Williston. 2 The seller gave a receipt which stated: "Received ...
ten £ for a gray, four-year-old colt, warranted sound in every
respect.' 13 The court found that the colt had been warranted as sound,
but there was no warranty of its age. The reference to "four-year-old"
was merely a "description. ' 4 In the sales act, Williston rejected that
distinction, and that rejection has come forward to us now as a
statement in UCC 2-313 whose purpose has been long forgotten.
In 1903, Williston defined express warranty in section 12 of the
Sales Act as follows:
Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the
goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation
or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the
buyer purchases the goods relying thereon. No affirmation of the value
of the goods, nor any statement purporting to be a statement of the
seller's opinion only shall be construed as a warranty.15
Williston was well-aware of warranty's tort roots and was plainly
respectful of them. The word "contract" does not appear in section 12.
Indeed, Williston might not have claimed that an express warranty was
a contract or that a suit in warranty was a claim in contract. Note that
section 12 requires not only a "natural tendency" that the statement or
promise induced the buyer to buy the goods, but also that the buyer
purchase "relying thereon." Williston would have quickly
acknowledged that neither of those conditions was necessary to
enforce a conventional promise in an executory contract.
When we jump to 1960 and Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, some of the messages of tort have disappeared, but
many of the issues that bothered Williston are still lurking. There is no
longer any requirement of inducement, nor a straightforward
requirement of reliance-the verb "relying" is now replaced by the
obscure "part of the basis of the bargain." However, even in 1960
Llewellyn found it necessary explicitly to deny the need to use formal
11. Id at 285-86.
12. See Budd v. Fairmaner, 8 Bing. 48, in id. at 267.
13. IId at267.
14. See idL at 267.
15. Uniform Sales Act § 12 (1906).
2094 [Vol. 72:2089
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words like "warrant" or to have a "specific intention. ' 6  As with
section 12 of the Sales Act, there is no statutory identification of
express warranty as "contract," but the comments show that Llewellyn
regarded both the reliance requirement as less significant than
Williston had and that-at least outside the black letter of the statute-
he did classify express warranty as contract. For example, in
Comment 3, he asserts that the section deals with affirmations of fact
"exactly as any other part of a negotiation which ends as a contract,"
17
and in Comment 7, speaking of the timing, he says: "The sole
question is whether the language or samples or models are fairly to be
regarded as part of the contract."' 8 Perhaps these comments are an
admission that if he had his own way and was free of the restraint of
the drafting committee (which controls the statute but not his
comments)-he might abandon all the trappings of tort, and make
express warranty simply a matter of contract.
That did not happen. Whether out of indecision or out of
deference to the drafting committee, Llewellyn kept "basis of the
bargain." 19 And that language is controversial. Writing for the New
York Law Revision Commission, Professor Honnold commented on
the uncertainty of its meaning.20 With the adoption of the Code many
16. U.C.C. § 2-313(2) (1995).
17. Id. § 2-313 cmt. 3.
18. Ma § 2-313 cmt. 7.
19. A 1944 draft of Llewellyn's revised Uniform Sales Act used the phrases "part of
the bargain" and "basis of the bargain" in different subsections of article 37, the express
warranty article. See Uniform Revised Sales Act, Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944 in 2
ELIZABETH SLUSSER KELLY, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: DRAFrS art. 37 (1984). By 1950,
in the Proposed Final Draft of the UCC, only "basis of the bargain" was used. See id. at 140.
This 1950 text was adopted in 1952 by the NCCUSL and the ALl. See 1956
Recommendations in 18 id. at 4. The New York Law Revision Commission did not adopt
this text, but examined it thoroughly and made its own recommendations to the Editorial
Board, including recommendations for section 2-313. The Commission wanted "basis of the
bargain" changed. A change to the current language was approved by the Editorial Board
and adopted in the 1957 official text. The Editorial Board stated:
The New York Commission criticized the limitation of subsection (1) to language,
a sample, or a model which becomes or is made "a basis of the bargain" on the
ground that "basis" might have been the same connotation as "basic" and thus
might drastically restrict the scope of express warranties. To avoid this unintended
connotation, the phrase "part of the basis of the bargain" was substituted.
See 1956 Recommendations in 18 id. at 61.
20. In 1995, Professor Honnold wrote:
A change less conducive to clarity is the Code's requirement that affirmations or
promises be "a basis of the bargain." This language is novel, and is a substitute for
the "reliance" test of Section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act .... The extent to which
the Code's "basis of the bargain" test would change present law is less than
clear .... There remains the central question: What is the meaning of "basis of the
bargain"? Possibly for lack of any other meaningful standard, courts must employ
1998] 2095
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writers offered interpretations about what it meant and how it should
be construed.2' Since the adoption of the Code, dozens of courts have
also passed on the phrase. I discuss those cases below.
The next statutory pronunciation on the issue of express warranty
is section 35 of the CISG. There Professor Honnold, our early
reviewer of Article 2 for the New York Law Revision Commission,
seems to take the final step; he emphatically stuffs express warranty
into the contract. Article 35, subsection 1, reads as follows: 'The
seller must deliver goods which are of the quantity, quality and
description required by the contract and which are contained or
packaged in the manner required by the contract."
Professor Honnold's International Sale of Goods law is not
concerned with manly "reliance" or even with less manly "basis of the
bargain." At its promulgation in 1980, he did not feel the need to use
words such as warranty or guarantee or even to use the word express
warranty, much less to require "reliance" or basis of the bargain. To
Honnold and the CISG, warranty is a term in a contract, period. As a
term in the contract, express warranty has the same weight as any
other term, can be broken, and gives rise to suit and recovery in the
same way as well. Also missing from the CISG is any suggestion that
the test of whether buyer relied on the affirmation or promise, the test presently
employed in Section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act.
Study of Uniform Commercial Code: Article 2-Sales, reprinted in 1 State of New York
Report of The Law Revision Commission for 1955, Study of the Uniform Commercial Code
at 335, 355, 392.
21. See generally Richard L. Savage III, Laying the Ghost of Reliance to Rest in
Section 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code: An "Endpoints" Analysis, 28 WAKE
FOREsr L. REv. 1065, 1092-93 (1993) (contending that their intent was to remove reliance);
Steven Z. Hodaszy, Express Warranties Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Is There a
Reliance Requirement?, 66 N.YU. L. REV. 468,488-94 (1991) (arguing that reliance must be
shown for some, but not all, 2-313 claims); Charles A. Heckman, "Reliance" or "Common
Honesty of Speech": The History and Interpretation of Section 2-313 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 38 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 1 (1987) (finding an intent to eliminate
reliance). Other articles have advanced new arguments that tend to oppose reliance in 2-313.
See, e.g., Thomas J. Holdych & Bruce D. Mann, The Basis of the Bargain Requirement: A
Market and Economic Based Analysis of Express Warranties-Getting What You Pay for and
Paying for What You Get, 45 DE PAUL L. REV. 781 (1996) (articulating a market-based
approach); Robert S. Adler, The Last Best Argument for Eliminating Reliance from Express
Warranties: "Real-World" Consumers Don't Read Warranties, 45 S.C. L. REv. 429, 472
(1994) (arguing that policy considerations compel the elimination of the reliance
requirement); John E. Murray, Jr., The Revision of Article 2: Romancing the Prism, 35 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 1447, 1486-90 (1994) (asserting a reasonable expectations approach);
Sidney Kwestel, Freedom from Reliance: A Contract Approach to Express Warranty, 26
SUFFoLK U. L. Rev. 959, 1029 (1992) (concluding that "promises or affirmations of fact
relating to the subject matter of contracts [] should be treated the same as any other terms of
the contract"); Debra L. Goetz et al, Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions:
An Update, 72 ComNEL. REv. 1159, 1183 (1987) (arguing that there should be no reliance
requirement).
2096 [Vol. 72:2089
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a statement made in advertising or generally to the public would give
rise to liability.2
fIL. REvisED ARnTCLE 2
Finally, we come to the March 1998 revision of UCC 2-313,
revised 2-403.' This revision abandons the basis of the bargain
language and appears to adopt the position of the CISG, namely, that
an express warranty is a term in an agreement, no more. Section 2-
403(b) reads in full as follows:
A representation that becomes part of the agreement creates an
express warranty. The seller has an obligation to the immediate buyer
that the goods will conform to the representation or, if a sample is
involved, that the whole of the goods will conform to the sample, or
that any promises that become part of the agreement will be performed.
The obligation is breached if the goods do not conform to any
representation at the time when the tender of delivery was completed or
if the promise was not performed when due.24
The Reporter's comment makes explicit his abandoning of tort:
[The phrase 'becomes part of the agreement' is substituted for
'becomes part of the basis of the bargain.' This change clarifies that an
express warranty is treated like any other term of the agreement and
that the buyer need not initially prove reliance to include it in the
agreement.2
Considering only section 2-403(b) and the accompanying
comment, one might conclude that the revisers of Article 2 have
followed Honnold's example in the CISG. I think that is wrong. True
enough, section 2-403(b) recognizes only express warranties that are
"part of the agreement," and the reporter affirms his intention in the
comment to treat express warranties like any other term in the contract.
But all of that is changed by section 2-403(a), a section without
parallel in the CISG. Subsection (a) opens the jaws of contract wide
enough to take in not only statements made long before and far away
from the traditional "contract" but also to capture post-sale, post-
22. This omission may have been influenced by the fact that the CISG does not apply
to the sale of consumer goods. Article 2 of the CISG states: 'This Convention does not
apply to sales: (a) of goods bought for personal, family or household use, unless the seller, at
any time before or at the conclusion of the contract, neither knew nor ought to have known
that the goods were bought for any such use ...." C.I.S.G. art. 2.
23. See Draft of March 1, 1998, § 2-403.
24. lL § 2-403(b).
25. Revision of Uniform Commercial Code Article 2-Sales, National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Draft of July 1, 1997, § 2-403 n.2, at 75.
1998] 2097
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contract assurances, statements, and the like. Under that subsection,
any "representation or promise relating to the goods to an immediate
buyer ... becomes part of the agreement"--wherever and however
made.26 Section 2-403 restricts the breadth of this contract in only two
ways. First, these representations or promises do not become part of
the agreement if "a reasonable person in the position of the immediate
buyer would not believe that the representation or promise became
part of the agreement." 27 Second, if the representation or promise is
made in a "medium for communication to the public," the buyer has to
have knowledge of it at the time of the agreement.28
The drafters of the revision have followed Llewellyn's guidance,
but they have done so only by opening the mouth of contract so wide
that everything will fall in. The base line is inclusion; the reasonable
person standard only excludes. How courts and juries might apply this
new definition of contract is impossible to know, but their task under
2-403(a) will be quite different from their task under the CISG, that's
for sure.
As I explain more fully in Part V below, I think it is unwise to
solve statutory problems by giving new meanings to words (such as
''agreement" or "contract') whose meanings are already well
established. I argue that the revisers have followed Llewellyn's
invitation to make all express warranties into contract an unreasonable
step too far. It is time to recognize that Llewellyn was wrong in trying
to stuff every bit of express warranty into contract; below I suggest an
alternative.
IV. ThE CASES
To see what is at stake among the current UCC, the CISG, and
the proposed revisions to Article 2 of the-UCC, I examined every case
26. Draft of March 1, 1998, § 2-403(a).
27. Section 2-403(a) of the Draft of March 1, 1998 states in full:
If a seller makes a representation or promise relating to the goods to an immediate
buyer, the representation or the promise becomes part of the agreement unless a
reasonable person in the position of the immediate buyer would not believe that the
representation or promise became part of the agreement or would believe that the
representation was merely of the value of the goods or purported merely to be the
seller's opinion or commendation of the goods.
It is not necessary to create an obligation under this section that the seller
use formal words such as "warranty" or "guarantee" or to have a specific intention
to make a warranty.
28. Section 2-403(c) of the Draft of March 1, 1998 states in full: "A seller's
obligation under this section may be created by representations and promises made in a
medium for communication to the public, including advertising, if the immediate buyer had
knowledge of [and believed] them at the time of the agreement." (modification in original).
2098 [Vol. 72:2089
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between 1965 and January 1998 that Westlaw produced under a search
"basis of the bargain" and "2-313." Done on January 23, 1998, the
search produced 263 cases that referred both to "basis of the bargain"
and "2-313." After I added a few cases and eliminated 112 (because
the basis of the bargain issue was not relevant to their outcomes), the
sample was approximately 150 cases. Only a small number of the
cases had elaborate discussions of basis of the bargain and of its
relationship to ideas of reliance. Among the cases that had a separate
and explicit consideration of the meaning of basis of the bargain, more
than half identified it as a "reliance" requirement.29 A smaller number
stated that the basis of the bargain was not the same as reliance, and a
few explicitly stated that "reliance" is "not required."30  The great
majority of the cases had no explicit statement on whether basis of the
bargain did or did not require reliance, but one might draw inferences
about the courts' views based upon what was said and what was left
unsaid in the opinions. For example, many decisions that did not
explicitly state that "basis of the bargain" was the same as reliance
29. See Sullivan v. Young Bros. & Co., Inc., 91 F.3d 242 (1st Cir. 1996); Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990); Speed Fastners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d
395 (10th Cir. 1967); Sprague v. Upjohn Co., Civ. A. No. 91-40035-NMG, 1995 WL 376934
(D. Mass. May 10, 1995); Teenoclima, S.p.A. v. PJC Group of New York, Inc., No. 89 Civ.
4437 (CS4), 1993 WL 404109 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 1993); Casper v. E.I. Du Pont de Memours
& Co., 806 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Wash. 1992); Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., Civ. A. No.
HAR 90-1424, 1992 WL 368062 (D. Md. Nov. 30, 1992); In re Jackson Television, Ltd., 121
B.R. 790 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1990); Stuto v. Coming Glass Works, CIV. A. No. 88-1150-WF,
1990 WL 105615 (D. Mass. July 23, 1990); Pilch, Inc. v. L & L Started Pullets, Inc., No. 84
Civ. 6513 (CS4), 1987 WL 9430 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1987); Shapiro Budrow & Assocs., Inc. v.
Microdata Corp., No. 84 Civ. 3589 (CBM), 1986 WL 2756 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 1986); Ray
Martin Painting, Inc. v. Ameron, Inc., 628 F Supp. 768 (D. Kan. 1986); Global Truck &
Equip. Co., Inc. v. Palmer Mach. Works, Inc., 628 F Supp. 641 (N.D. Miss. 1986); Potler v.
MCP Facilities Corp., 471 R Supp. 1344 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Goodwin v. Durant Bank & Trust
Co., No. 86764, 1998 WL 20821 (Okla. Jan. 29, 1998); Weng v. Allison, 678 N.E.2d 1254
(ill. App. Ct. 1997); Vlasin v. Shuey, 2 Neb. C.A. 712 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993); Hillcrest
Country Club v. N.D. Judds Co., 461 N.W.2d 55 (Neb. 1990); Adolphson v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 553 N.E.2d 793 (Il1. App. Ct. 1990); Wendt v. Beardmore Suburban Chevrolet, Inc., 366
N.W.2d 424 (Neb. 1985); Cuthbertson v. Clark Equip. Co., 448 A.2d 315 (Me. 1982); Sass v.
Spradlin, 384 N.E.2d 464 (11l. App. Ct. 1978); Sessa v. Riegle, 427 R Supp. 760 (E.D. Pa.
1977); Stamm v. Wilder Travel Trailers, 358 N.E.2d 382 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976); Downs v.
Shouse, 501 P.2d 401 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972); Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau Co-Op
Ass'n, 286 N.E.2d 188 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972); Capital Equip. Enters., Inc. v. North Pier
Terminal Co., 254 N.E.2d 542 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969).
30. See Lutz Farms v. Asgrow Seed Co., 948 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1991); Mattingly,
Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 835 E2d 1547 (10th Cir. 1987), vacated by 852 F.2d 516 (10th
Cir. 1988); Neff v. Kehoe, 708 F.2d 639 (1 lth Cir. 1983); Mainline Tractor & Equip. Co., Inc.
v. Nutrite Corp., 937 R Supp. 1095 (D. Vt. 1996); Comp-U-Aid, Inc. v. Berk-Tek, Inc., 547
N.W.2d 640 (Mich. 1995); Murphy v. Mallard Coach Co., 582 N.Y.S.2d 528 (N.Y. App. Div.
1992); Pack & Process, Inc. v. Celotex Corp., 503 A.2d 646 (Del. Super. 1985); Keith v.
Buchanan, 173 Cal. App. 3d 13,220 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1985).
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nevertheless were careful to point out that the buyer had "relied."
Such a statement is a weak reed for proving that reliance is a condition
to recovery in express warranty, but these courts were sufficiently
uneasy about the meaning of basis of the bargain that they specifically
stated that the buyer had relied.
Reliance plays a large enough role in my 150 cases that excising
basis of the bargain from 2-403 would make a measurable change in
the law. While I have not made an attempt to run the doctrine into the
ground in any jurisdiction, I have cases from at least ten
jurisdictions-including prominent ones such as Illinois and New
York-from which one could argue that the basis of the bargain
language in section 2-313 requires that a buyer show reliance as a
condition to recovery in express warranty.3
31. In many states there are cases taking irreconcilable positions as to whether
reliance by the buyer is required for express warranty liability. While some cases from each
of the following jurisdictions require reliance, there are others in most of these jurisdictions
that grant recovery without explicitly mentioning reliance. See, for example, in Maryland:
Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., Civ. A. No. HAR 90-1424, 1992 WL 368062 at *5 (D.
Md. Nov. 30, 1992) ("[T]he court would have to find that such representations induced the
Worms to purchase Scepter.... [B]ecause the literature upon which the [p]laintiffs rely did
not exist in 1987 and [p]Ilaintiffs therefore could not have relied on it ... it did not become
part of the basis of the bargain."); Illinois: Stamm v. Wilder Travel Trailers, 358 N.E.2d 382,
385 (Il. App. Ct. 1976) ("[Cjases under the present day Commercial Code ... require a
reliance by the buyer upon the promise, affirmation or description."); cf Adolphson v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 553 N.E.2d 793, 798 (II. Ct. App. 1990) ("[T]he trial court was not
obligated to accept the plaintiff's argument that the sales brochure created an express
warranty ... given the fact that Adolphson testified that he did not rely on the sales
brochure...."); but see Weng v. Allison, 678 N.E.2d 1254, 1256 (Ill. App. 1997) (citation
omitted) ("[T]he trial court's ruling that the statements of the seller could not have been part
of the basis of the bargain simply because no reasonable persons could have relied upon
those statements was erroneous. The trial court misconstrued the role of reliance in
determining whether an affirmation of fact or description is part of the basis of the bargain.
Affirmations of fact made during the bargain are presumed to be part of the basis of the
bargain unless clear, affirmative proof otherwise is shown .... It is not necessary, therefore,
for the buyer to show reasonable reliance upon the seller's affirmations .. "); New York:
Scaringe v. Holstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 903, 904 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (citation omitted) ("A
necessary element in the creation of an express warranty is the buyer's reliance upon the
seller's affirmations or promises."); Pilch, Inc. v. L & L Started Pullets, Inc., No. 84 Civ.
6513 (CSH), 1987 WL 9430, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1987) (citation omitted) ("[I]n order to
succeed on an express warranty theory under [2-313], it is necessary for the purchaser to
plead and prove that the written promotional literature in question was furnished to buyer
prior to the purchase, and relied upon him [sic] in making the purchase."); Shapiro Budrow &
Assocs., Inc. v. Microdata Corp., No. 84 Civ. 3589 (CBM), 1986 WL 2756, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 24, 1986) (quoting Eddington v. Dick, 386 N.Y.S.2d 180, 181 (City Court, Geneva
County, 1976)) ("In order to make out a cause of action for breach of express warranty, the
buyer must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence, 1) an affirmation of fact or
promise by the seller, 2) the natural tendency of the said affirmation or promise was to induce
the buyer to purchase goods; 3) [t]hat the buyer purchased goods in reliance thereon .. .");
cf Tecnoclima, S.p.A. v. PJC Group of New York, Inc., No. 89 Civ. 4437 (CSH), 1993 WL
404109, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 1993) ("[T]he finder of fact could determine that Circle relied
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on the specifications in assessing the marketability of the boiler/burner combination. Such a
finding would support a claim for breach of express warranty."); but see CBS Inc. v. Ziff-
Davis Publ'g Co., 553 N.E.2d 997, 1001 (N.Y. 1990) (citation omitted) ("[T'his view of
'reliance'-i.e., as requiring no more than reliance on the express warranty as being a part of
the bargain between the parties-reflects the prevailing perception of an action for breach of
express warranty as one that is no longer grounded in tort, but essentially in contract. The
express warranty is as much a part of the contract as any other term. Once the express
warranty is shown to have been relied on as part of the contract, the right [to damages] for its
breach does not depend on proof that the buyer thereafter believed that the assurances of fact
made in the warranty would be fulfilled."); Rogath v. Siebenmann, 129 F.3d 261, 264 (2d Cir.
1997) (quoting Galli v. Metz, 973 F.2d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 1992) (emphasis in original)
("'Where a buyer closes on a contract in the full knowledge and acceptance of facts disclosed
by the seller which would constitute a breach of warranty under the terms of the contract, the
buyer should be foreclosed from later asserting the breach ... unless the buyer expressly
preserves his rights under the warranties .... On the other hand, if the seller is not the source
of the buyer's knowledge, e.g., if it is merely "common knowledge" that the facts warranted
are false ... , the buyer may prevail in his claim for breach of warranty"'); Massachusetts:
Sprague v. Upjohn Co., Civ. A. No. 91-40035-NMG, 1995 WL 376934, at *3 (D. Mass. May
10, 1994) (citation omitted) ("[I]n an express warranty claim, plaintiff must show reliance on
such warranty."); Stuto v. Coming Glass Works, Civ. A. No. 88-1150-WF, 1990 WL 105615,
at *5 (D. Mass. July 23, 1990) ("[Tlhis court believes that some minimum of reliance is a
required element of a breach of express warranty claim .... ); cf. Roth v. Bay-Stel's Hair
Stylists, Inc., 470 N.E.2d 137, 138 (Mass. App. 1984) (noting that "[tihe hairdresser testified
that he had read the information printed on the box, and, relying on it, he recommended its
use to Judith Roth"); Hannon v. Original Gunite Aquatech Pools, Inc., 434 N.E.2d 611, 617
(Mass. 1982) (noting that "[t]he trial judge found that Hannon relied on Aquatech's
brochure"); Jacquot v. Win. Filene's Sons Co., 149 N.E.2d 635, 637 (Mass. 1958) (noting
that "Mrs. Jacquot ... relied upon these express warranties"); but see Wechsler v. Long
Island Rehabilitation Ctr. of Nassau, Inc., No. Civ. A. 93-6946-13, 1996 WL 590679, at *22
(Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 1996) ('The trustee is not required to establish that in connection
with a specific account receivable it purchased, Towers relied on the factual truth of each of
the representations and warranties; what must be shown is that Towers relied on the fact of
the warranties, that is, the promise itself that the representations and warranties were
true...."); Kentucky: Overstreet v. Norden Lab., Inc., 669 F.2d 1286, 1291 (6th Cir. 1982)
(citation omitted) ("A warranty is the basis of the bargain if it has been relied upon as one of
the inducements for purchasing the product."); Nebraska: Vlasin v. Shuey, No. A-91-324,
1993 WL 61875, *1 (Neb. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 1994) ("Nebraska case law has long held that the
assertion of a fact or promise by a seller concerning goods, which is relied upon by the buyer
and which tends to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, is an express warranty.");
Hillcrest Country Club v. N.D. Judds Co., 461 N.W.2d 55, 61 (Neb. 1990) (citation omitted)
('This court has held that '[s]ince an express warranty must have been "made part of the
basis of the bargain," it is essential that the plaintiffs prove reliance upon the warranty."');
Wendt v. Beardmore Suburban Chevrolet, Inc., 366 N.W.2d 424, 428 (Neb. 1985) (citation
omitted) ("Since an express warranty must have been 'made part of the basis of the bargain,'
it is essential that the plaintiffs prove reliance upon the warranty."); Indiana: Royal Bus.
Machs., Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 44 n.7 (7th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted) ('The
requirement that a statement be part of the basis of the bargain in order to constitute an
express warranty 'is essentially a reliance requirement ... "'); Kansas: Ray Martin Painting,
Inc. v. Ameron, Inc., 638 F Supp. 768, 772 (D. Kan. 1986) (citation omitted) ("Whether the
statements about the coating ability of the Amerlock created an express warranty depends on
whether they were 'part of the basis of the bargain' which, under Kansas law, requires some
type of reliance on the part of the buyer."); Mississippi: Global Truck & Equip. Co., Inc. v.
Palmer Mach. Works, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 641, 652 (N.D. Miss. 1986) ("Given the express
language used in UCC section 2-313 and the majority of the cases holding that the buyer
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Consider the case of Mr. Stamm who sued his seller for breach of
express warranty with respect to a "travel trailer."32 Stamm claimed
that the seller had given an express warranty that the trailer was an
"unused, like new, 1970 model travel trailer." Noting that the plaintiff
never testified that he relied upon "the belief that the trailer was a 1970
model," and stating that the Uniform Commercial Code requires "a
reliance by the buyer upon the promise, affirmation, or description
..." the court found that the plaintiff had not established his cause of
action in express warranty.
Similar language appears in Overstreet v. Norden Laboratories,33
where Judge Keith, speaking for the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, interpreted Kentucky law to mean that "[a]
warranty is the basis of the bargain if it has been relied upon as one of
the inducements for purchasing the product.
3 4
It is easy to underestimate the importance of reliance in cases
under 2-313. But in truth, only a small minority of my 150 cases are at
all articulate about the meaning of basis of the bargain. Many of the
cases that do not explicitly mention basis of the bargain as a reliance
requirement nevertheless are careful to point out that the plaintiff in
that case did rely. Others merely reiterate the basis of the bargain
language. So I do not claim that a majority of the courts would find
the basis of the bargain to be a reliance requirement, but I believe that
a far larger number of courts find reliance to be a condition to express
warranty liability than the academic literature would suggest. At least
until the rise of the law and economics movement, the post-war
academic literature35 has been much more sympathetic to the
expansion of liability than to its restriction.36
must both be knowledgeable of and rely on the affirmation of fact before an express warranty
is created, the court concludes that the plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the statements contained in the Palmer brochure were relied upon by Randall
prior to or contemporaneously with the making of the contract between Global and Palmer.
Therefore, recovery under the theory of breach of express warranty is also precluded.");
Washington: Casper v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 806 F Supp. 903, 909 (E.D. Wash.
1992) (citation omitted) ("If, in fact, Mr. Warr assured Brad Casper that Velpar could be
applied safely during November or December of 1990, and Mr. Casper relied upon that
affirmation of fact in deciding to have PureGro treat his fields, an express warranty was
created.").
32. See Stamm v. Wilder Travel Trailers, 358 N.E.2d 382 (Il. App. Ct. 1976).
33. 669 F.2d 1286 (6th Cir. 1982).
34. Id. at 1291.
35. See, e.g., William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel: Strict Liability to the
Consumer, 69 YALEL. 1099 (1960).
36. See, e.g., Kwestel, supra note 21, at 991 & n.106; Adler, supra note 21, at 448-
49; Goetz et al., supra note 21, at 1183; Murray, supra note 21, at 1486-88.
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The most interesting findings from my 150 cases are set out in
the accompanying chart. Nearly half of all the basis of the bargain
cases arise from oral statements made before or simultaneously with
the sale. About one-third of the cases arise from presale advertising or
brochures that are given to the buyer or seen by the buyer. The
remaining cases are scattered among the remaining six categories.
Basis of the Bargain Cases
Oral (and a few written) statements made by seller 74
before or simultaneous with sale.37
37. See Thacker v. Menard, Inc., 105 F.3d 382 (7th Cir. 1997); Duvall v. Bristol-
Myers-Squibb Co., 103 F3d 324 (4th Cir. 1996); Neff v. Kehoe, 708 F.2d 639 (1lth Cir.
1983); Royal Business Machines, Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34 (7th Cir. 1980); Gillette
Dairy, Inc. v. Hydrotex Indus., Inc., 440 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1971); Tralon Corp. v. Cedarapids,
Inc., 966 F. Supp. 812 (N.D. Iowa 1997); Allmand Assocs., Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 960 F.
Supp. 1216 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Reed v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 934 F. Supp. 713 (D. Md.
1996); O'Connor v. Judith B. & Roger C. Young, Inc., No. C-93-4547 DLJ, 1995 WL
415138 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 1995); Matter of L.B. Trucking, Inc., 163 B.R. 709 (Bankr. D.
Del. 1994); Delta Marine, Inc. v. Whaley, 813 F. Supp. 414 (E.D.N.C. 1993); Flynn v.
Biomet, Inc., Civ. A. No. 3:93CV192 1993 WL 540570 (E.D. Va.); Casper v. E.I. Du Pont
De Nemours and Co., 806 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Wash. 1992); Glyptal Inc. v. Engelhard Corp.,
801 F. Supp. 887 (D. Mass. 1992); Balog v. Center Art Gallery-Hawaii, Inc., 745 F. Supp.
1556 (D. Haw. 1990); St. Charles Cable TV, Inc. v. Eagle Comtronics, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 820
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); Alpert v. Thomas, 643 F. Supp. 1406 (D. Vt. 1986); Shipco 2295 Inc. v.
Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 631 R Supp. 1123 (E.D. La. 1986); Potler v. MCP Facilities Corp.,
471 F. Supp. 1344 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F Supp. 760 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Puritan Mfg., Inc. v. I. Klayman & Co., 379 F Supp. 1306' (E.D. Pa. 1974); Goodwin v.
Durant Bank & Trust Co., No. 86764, 1998 WL 20821 (Okla. Jan. 20, 1998); Ekizian v.
Capurro, 444 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Justice Ct. 1981); Weng v. Allison, 678 N.E.2d 1254 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1997); Sellers v. Morrow Auto Sales, No. CA97-06-053, 1997 WL 786219 (Ohio Ct.
App.); Wyatt v. Motorola, Inc., Coy. A. No. 93A-01-004, 1994 WL 714006 (Del. Super. Ct.
March 11, 1994); Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc. v. Garten, 618 A.2d 233 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1993); Frank Griffin Volkswagen, Inc. v. Smith, 610 So. 2d 597 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992); Guiggey v. Bombardier, 615 A.2d 1169 (Me. 1992); Warner v. Reagan Buick, Inc.,
483 N.W.2d 764 (Neb. 1992); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FDP Corp., 811 S.W.2d 572
(Tex. 1991); Sweco, Inc. v. Continental Sulfur & Chern., 808 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Civ. App.-
El Paso 1991, no writ); Bimex Corp. v. Elite Plastic Servs., Inc., 558 N.E.2d 299 (111. App.
Ct. 1990); Hillcrest Country Club v. N.D. Judds Co., 461 N.W.2d 55 (Neb. 1990); Barksdale
v. Van's Auto Sales, Inc., 577 N.E.2d 426 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); St. Croix Printing Equip.,
Inc. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 428 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Bernstein v. Sherman,
497 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Justice Ct. 1986); Tri-City Property Management Servs., Inc. v. Research
Products Corp., 721 P.2d 144 (Ariz. App. 1986); Hutch Material & Supply Corp. v. Costa,
507 A.2d 943 (Vt. 1986); Pack & Process, Inc. v. Celotex Corp., 503 A.2d 646 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1985); Miller v. Lentine, 495 A.2d 1229 (Me. 1985); Wendt v. Beardmore Suburban
Chevrolet, Inc., 366 N.W.2d 424 (Neb. 1985); Taylor v. Alfama, 481 A.2d 1059 (Vt. 1984);
Slyman v. Pickwick Farms, 472 N.E.2d 380 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); Warren v. Joseph Harris
Co., Inc., 313 S.E.2d 901 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984); Jones v. Kellner, 451 N.E.2d 548 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1982); England v. Leithoff, 323 N.W.2d 98 (Neb. 1982); Albin Elevator Co. v. Pavlica,
649 P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1982); Kates Millinery, Ltd. v. Benay-Albee Corp., 450 N.Y.S.2d 975
(N.Y. Cir. Ct. 1982); Pake v. Byrd, 286 S.E.2d 588 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982); Leininger v. Sola,
314 N.W.2d 39 (N.D. 1981); Barb v. Wallace, 412 A.2d 1314 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980);
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1 Advertising or brochure given or seen before sale38 - 42 [
Yates v. Clifford Motors, Inc., 423 A.2d 1262 (Pa. Super. 1980); Trimpey lire Sales & Serv.,
Inc. v. Stine, 403 A.2d 108 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979); Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. v. Conley,
372 So. 2d 965 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Ewers v. Eisenzopf, 276 N.W2d 802 (Wis. 1979);
Sass v. Spradlin, 384 N.E.2d 464 (IlI. App. Ct. 1978); R. Clinton Const. Co. v. Bryant &
Reaves, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 838 (N.D. Miss. 1977); Werner v. Montana, 378 A.2d 1130 (N.H.
1977); Stamm v. Wilder Travel Trailers, 358 N.E.2d 382 (111. App. Ct. 1976); Alan Wood
Steel Co. v. Capital Equip. Enter., Inc., 349 N.E.2d 627 (I11. App. Ct. 1976); Shotkoski v.
Standard Chem. Mfg. Co., 237 N.W.2d 92 (Neb. 1975); Shore Line Properties, Inc. v. Deer-
O-Paints & Chems., Ltd., 538 P.2d 760 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975); Larutan Corp. v. Magnolia
Homes Mfg. Co., 209 N.W.2d 177 (Neb. 1973); Smith v. Bruce, 198 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1973); Weiss v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 293 N.E.2d 375 (iI. Ct. App. 1973); Downs v.
Shouse, 501 P2d 401 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972); Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau Co-op
Ass'n, Inc., 286 N.E.2d 188 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972); Janssen v. Hook, 272 N.E.2d 385 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1971); Axion Corp. v. G.D.C. Leasing Corp., 269 N.E.2d 664 (Mass. 1971); Capital
Equip. Enters., Inc. v. North Pier Terminal Co., 254 N.E.2d 542 (111. Ct. App. 1969); Blade v.
Sloan, 248 N.E.2d 142 (IIl. Ct. App. 1969); Agar v. Kysar, 628 P2d 1350 (Wyo. 1981);
Society Nat'l Bank v. Pemberton, 409 N.E.2d 1073 (Ohio 1979); Pelc v. Simmons, 23
UCC.2d 1113 (ill. App. Ct. 1993).
38. See Sullivan v. Young Bros. & Co., Inc., 91 F3d 242 (1st Cir. 1996); Lutz Farms
v. Asgrow Seed Co., 948 E2d 638 (10th Cir. 1991); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893
F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990); Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc., 708
F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1983); Neville Const. Co. v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 671 E2d 1107 (8th
Cir. 1982); Overstreet v. Norden Labs., Inc., 669 F.2d 1286 (6th Cir. 1982); Drayton v. Jiffee
Chem. Corp., 591 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1978); Providence & Worcester R. Co. v. Sargent &
Greenleaf, Inc., 802 F Supp. 680 (D.R.I. 1992); In re Lone Star Indus., Inc., 776 R Supp. 206
(D. Md. 1991); In re Jackson Television, Ltd., 121 B.R. 790 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1990);
Adolphson v. Gardner-Denver Co., 553 N.E.2d 793 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Semowich v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 1988 WL 123930 (N.D.N.Y.); Ray Martin Painting, Inc. v. Ameron,
Inc., 628 F. Supp. 768 (D. Kan. 1986); Global Truck & Equipment Co., Inc. v. Palmer Mach.
Works, Inc., 638 F Supp. 641 (N.D. Miss. 1986); Keith v. Buchanan, 173 Cal. App. 3d 13,
220 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1985); Mennonite Deaconess Home & Hosp., Inc. v. Gates Eng'g Co.,
Inc., 363 N.W.2d 155 (Neb. 1985); Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F Supp. 379 (E.D.
Mich. 1985); Computerized Radiological Servs., Inc. v. Syntex Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1495
(E.D.N.Y 1984); Jaskey Finance & Leasing v. Display Data Corp., 564 F Supp. 160 (E.D.
Pa. 1983); Parzek v. New England Log Homes, Inc., 460 N.YS.2d 698 (1983); Crest
Container Corp. v. R.H. Bishop Co., 445 N.E.2d 19, 67 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Hannon v.
Original Gunite Aquatech Pools, Inc., 434 N.E.2d 611 (Mass. 1982); Mazzuocola v.
Thunderbird Products Corp., 1995 WL 311397 (E.D.N.Y.); Penta v. Covino, 1994 WL 14858
(Mass.); In re General Motors Corp. Anti-Lock Brake Products Liability Litigation, 966 F
Supp. 1525 (E.D. Mo. 1997); Fahey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 1995 WL 809837
(Mass.); State By and Through Div. of Consumer Protection v. GAF Corp., 760 P2d 310
(Utah 1988); Pilch, Inc. v. L & L Started Pullets, Inc., 1987 WL 9430 (S.D.N.Y.); Maryland
Nat'l Bank v. Gregorcic, 1982 WL 5218 (Ohio App.); Wells v. Web Mach. Co., 315 N.E.2d
301 (111. App. Ct. 1974); Rinkmasters v. City of Utica, 348 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1973); Vlasin v.
Shuey, 2 Neb. C.A. 712 (Neb. App. 1993); Effanzee Assocs. v. Thermo Electron Corp., 1994
WL 6885 (E.D. Pa.); Ampat/Midwest, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 1988 WL 53222
(N.D. Ill.); AFA Corp. v. Phoenix Closures, Inc., 501 F Supp. 224 (N.D. I. 1980);
McGregor v. Dimou, 422 N.Y.S.2d 806 (1979); Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney &
Trecker Corp., 428 F Supp. 364 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Auto-Teria, Inc. v. Ahem, 352 N.E.2d
774 (Ind. App. Ct. 1976); Eddington v. Dick, 386 N.YS.2d 180 (1976); Hawkins Constr. Co.
v. Matthews Co., Inc., 209 N.W.2d 643 (Neb. 1973); Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Secord Bros.,
Inc., 343 N.YS.2d 256 (1973); Speed Fastners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir.
1967).
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Catalog (buyer ordered from)39  1
Sample or model shown to buyer before or during 16
salePo
Label on product4  3
Owner's manual42  3
Post-sale assurance (oral or written) 3  9
Advertising seen afterwards' 2
Total Cases 150
What lessons does one draw from these cases? First, the problem
is manageable. Basically, the drafters need consider only oral
statements made before or simultaneously with the sale and statements
in brochures or other forms of advertising seen by the buyer prior to
the sale. It should be simple to design law that would deal adequately
39. See Peterson v. North Am. Plant Breeders, 354 N.W.2d 625 (Neb. 1984).
40. See Greg Stout Logging v. United States, 892 F.2d 1051 (Fed. Cir. 1989 (table));
Empire Gas Corp. v. American Bakeries Co., 840 F2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1988); Borman's Inc. v.
Olympic Mills, Inc., No. 91 Civ. 4244 (LJF), 1993 WL 190344 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1992); J.
Moreria, LDA. v. Rio Rio, Inc., No. 91 Civ. 2462 (LJF), 1992 WL 395577 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
15, 1992); Comark Merchandising, Inc. v. The Highland Group, Inc., No. 88C4895, 1990
WL 17115 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Trans-Aire Int'l, Inc. v. Northern Adhesive Co., Inc., No.
83C7003, 1988 WL 6665 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 1988); Rock Creek Ginger Ale Co., Inc. v.
Thermice Corp., 352 F. Supp. 522 (D.D.C. 1971); Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide
Corp., 294 F Supp. 649 (W.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 422 F.2d 1205 (3d
Cir. 1970); Furlong v. Alpha Chi Omega Sorority, 657 N.E.2d 866 (Ohio Misc. 1993); Barton
v. Tra-Mo, Inc., 686 P.2d 423 (Or. Ct. App. 1984); Dormont Mfg. Co., Inc. v. rIT Grinnell
Corp., 469 A.2d 1138 (Pa. Super. 1983); Import Traders, Inc. v. Frederick Mfg. Corp., 457
N.Y.S.2d 742 (1983); Indust-Ri-Chem Lab., Inc. v. Par-Pak Co., Inc., 602 S.W.2d 282 (Tex.
Civ. App. Dallas 1980 no writ); FMC Corp. v. Seal Tape Ltd., Inc., 396 N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1977); Pacific Marine Schwabacher, Inc. v. Hydroswift Corp., 525 P.2d 615 (Utah
1974); Baltimore Mach. & Equip., Inc. v. Holtite Mfg. Co. Inc., 215 A.2d 458 (Md. 1965).
41. See Vermont Plastics, Inc. v. Brine, Inc., 79 E3d 272 (2d Cir. 1996); Mainline
Tractor & Equip. Co., Inc. v. Nutrite Corp., 937 F Supp. 1095 (D. Vt. 1996); Martin Rispens
& Sons v. Hall Farms, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1078 (Ind. 1993).
42. See Comp-U-Aid, Inc. v. Berk-Tek, Inc., 547 N.W.2d 640 (Mich. 1995); Connick
v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 656 N.E.2d 170 (11. App. Ct. 1995); Cuthbertson v. Clark Equip.
Co., 448 A.2d 315 (Me. 1982).
43. See McDermott, Inc. v. Clyde Iron, 979 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1992); Gold'n Plump
Poultry, Inc. v. Simmons Eng'g Co., 805 F2d 1312 (8th Cir. 1986); Klein v. Sears Roebuck
& Co., 773 F2d 1421 (4th Cir. 1985); Downie v. Abex Corp., 741 E2d 1235 (10th Cir.
1984); Bigelow v. Agway, Inc., 506 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1974); Murphy v. Mallard Coach Co.,
582 N.Y.S.2d 528 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); Norman Gershman's Things to Wear, Inc. v.
Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 558 A.2d 1066 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989); Moldex, Inc. v.
Ogden Eng'g Corp., 652 E Supp. 584 (D. Conn. 1987); Flory v. Silvercrest Indus., Inc., 633
P.2d 383 (Ariz. 1981); Jones v. Abriani, 350 N.E.2d 635 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
44. See Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., Civ. A. No. HAR 90-1424, 1992 WL
368062 (D. Md.); Stuto v. Corning Glass Works, Civ. A. No. 88-1150-WF, 1990 WL 105615
(D. Mass. July 23, 1990).
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with these limited issues. This is not a complex or large universe, and
it calls for fairly simple rules.
The second lesson from the cases is that reliance lives. A
minority of the courts explicitly require reliance as a condition to
buyer's recovery.45 But even in courts that do not insist upon reliance,
there is often a recognition of its significance by a finding that the
buyer did rely.46
In short, the cases tell us that any revision can and somehow
should take account of reliance.
V. REVISIG REvisED 2-403
Most of the problems in my 150 cases arise from the difficulty in
making every conceivable express warranty into part of the contract.
Those difficulties are exacerbated by Llewellyn's choice of words
("basis of the bargain") and they are not solved by Llewellyn's
exhortations in the comments that express warranty is "merely
contract."
Whatever Llewellyn's intention and despite the comments, the
black letter law that he has left us is not handy at making every express
warranty into a contract term. If Llewellyn did not intend basis of the
bargain to be a proxy for a diluted form of reliance, he has fooled
many courts. Some courts now reject statements claiming to be
warranties because the buyer did not rely, and many courts feel the
necessity of stating that a particular buyer did rely. In fact, of course,
Llewellyn may have appreciated the difficulty of making every
assurance into part of the contract and might have intended to
reintroduce a reliance requirement in his basis of the bargain language.
If so, the "reliance" courts are not misreading him.
Second, the current Code does not adequately explain how
statements, such as those in advertising brochures and catalogs that are
far removed from the time and place of contracting-and are not in
any sense incorporated into the document that the parties recognized
as a "contract"--are themselves to be part of that contract.
Third, Llewellyn's invitation in Comment 7 to 2-313 to treat
post-sales statements as "a modification" itself skips over the problem
45. See supra note 27.
46. In fact, the knowledge requirements now embodied in the draft of 2-408 and 2-
403(c) are themselves crypto reliance requirements. Why must one have knowledge of an
advertisement before he can recover, if having knowledge, he does not rely on it? What
about the language in revised 2-403 that lets the seller off the hook if the buyer doesn't
believe the warranty, or if the warranty is merely puffing? Are not these also crypto reliance
requirements?
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of fitting that idea into 2-209, which states that "[a]n agreement
modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration to be
binding." Section 2-209 plainly contemplates an "agreement." And,
to me, an "agreement" is more than merely an "additional assurance"
given at the time of delivery.47
So, if Professor Llewellyn intended to make a complete transition
from tort to contract and to leave nothing outside of the contract that
could be called an express warranty, he did an imperfect job. He left
behind the vestigial appearances of the reliance requirement, and he
insufficiently explained how one was to import into the "contract"
advertising and other statements made before negotiations were begun
or the contract was signed or statements made long after the contract
was signed.
Well aware of the difficulties with the basis of the bargain
language, and also of the tort history, Professor Honnold made a clean
cut in his drafting of section 35: "Seller has to deliver goods of the
quality, quantity and description required by the contract." If we wish
to make all express warranties into the terms in a contract, and if we do
not wish to grant express warranty status to any term that is not part of
the contract, Professor Honnold has shown us how to do it with article
35 of the CISG.
The reason that Professor Speidel, the reporter for revised Article
2, does not copy the concise language of Professor Honnold, is that
Speidel wants broader liability. Beset by critics, Professor Speidel has
characterized the CISG as "nineteenth century law,' 48 and it seems
obvious that he intends sellers to bear greater liability than they will
bear under article 35 of the CISG. In what way is the CISG too
narrow? If one uses a conventional definition of "the contract" in
article 35, presumably descriptions such as those in advertising
brochures, and in other advertising and terms stated orally or in writing
after the deal is signed, will not be express warranties because they
will not be part of the contract-at least as "contract" is likely to be
defined in a conventional setting where there is a record either in
writing or in some other medium that sets down the agreement of the
47. See U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1995) ("'Agreement' means the bargain of the parties in
fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances including course
of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance as provided in this Act.").
48. See Memorandum from Richard E. Speidel & Linda Rusch, The July 1, 1997
Draft of Revised Article 2: A Response to Critics and Proposals for Further Revisions (Sept.
12, 1997) (on file with author). Speidel and Rusch state: 'It appears that the 'loyal
opposition' would really prefer a sales revision based upon a late 19th and early 20th century
model of contract, such as is the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods." Id. at 19.
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parties. Presumably, Professor Speidel wished to leave room for
liability arising out of statements made before the negotiation or long
after the contract is signed. Put differently, Professor Speidel, a well-
known buyer's friend, certainly did not want to propose law that
would have restricted the warranty coverage that is available
particularly to consumer buyers under the current version of the
Uniform Commercial Code. It seems likely that article 35 of the CISG
will do exactly that.
Accordingly, Professor Speidel has chosen the contract model
quite as fully as Professor Honnold in the CISG, but with the
exception described above. To achieve his purpose, he makes a novel
definition of agreement-the agreement includes every representation
or promise relating to the goods (without regard to its distance in time
and place from the conventional "contract") "unless a reasonable
person in the position of the immediate buyer would not believe that
the representation or promise became part of the agreement."49 The
quoted language opens up the possibility not only for oral statements
made prior to the contract, but also for statements in a catalog, an
advertising brochure, or in other forms of advertising. By the same
token, it might include statements made after the sale, statements in an
owner's manual, and statements contained on a label or container.
Having opened the jaws of contract far wider than traditional law does,
Professor Speidel is able to do away with basis of the bargain or any
other reliance requirement because, like Professor Honnold under the
CISG, he has transformed all of express warranty into contract.
But, the open-jawed definition of contract in 2-403(a) (every
representation or promise unless a person in the position of the buyer
would believe that it is not part of the contract), is novel, potentially
limitless, and necessarily ill-defined. For a commercial seller,
sweeping every datum into a contract-that an unreasonable jury
might think a reasonable person in the position of buyer would think
was there-is frightening. The seller has no way of knowing what a
reasonable buyer would think was part of the contract, nor what a
judge or jury would think a reasonable person would think.
I am sympathetic to Professor Speidel's goals, but I disagree with
his methods. To understand the cases where there should be express
warranty liability, return to my 150 cases that are discussed above. I
can identify three subsets where most would think the seller should be
liable if his representation is inaccurate or his promise is broken.
49. Draft of March 1, 1998, § 2-403(2).
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First are representations or promises that would be part of the
contract under conventional definitions of contract. These would
include everything in a record itself as well as all oral promises and
assurances made by the seller in negotiations before or contempora-
neously with the sale. As long as there is no integration, conventional
doctrine would make these data into part of the contract. I see no
reason why the law should not recognize and enforce those terms as
contract terms without any additional requirement about reliance or
basis of the bargain. A person is bound by his contract even to an
obligee who has never read the contract, much less relied on its
terms.
50
Second is a limited subset of post-contract representations or
promises. These are the statements in owner's manuals and promises
or descriptions made on labels or in other documents that are attached
to or otherwise delivered with the product. Despite Llewellyn's
exhortation to the contrary in Comment 7 to 2-313, I have never
understood how an owner's manual can be the modification of a
contract earlier made, perhaps by the parties' signing a formal
document. Even though these do not seem to be part of the contract,
everyone-including the seller-would acknowledge that the seller
should have liability for their inaccuracy or breach. Because these
terms are in writing (or perhaps in some other form of "record" in the
electronic medium of the future), because they refer to a specific
product that is the subject of a particular sale and are directed to the
particular buyer, these terms deserve higher status than other
statements in advertising or than oral assurances and the like.
For this second subset I would impose liability for inaccuracy by
statute and without any requirement that the buyer rely or that they
somehow become part of the contract. Because of their close
association with the deal and because both the buyer and the seller
anticipate these terms, both parties should anticipate contract-like
liability even though these terms will not be part of the contract and
even though the buyer is unlikely ever to have taken any action in
reliance on them.
The third subset is representations and promises that are made in
advertising brochures, catalogs, orally, or in other media but made in
such a way or of such a character that they do not fall within the first
two categories. My cases show that most of these precede the deal,
but some will come after the contract is made. Because these do not
50. See RE A EMENT (SEcoND) CoNTRAcrs § 211 cmt. b ("Assent to unknown
terms").
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enjoy the status of the owner's manual nor that given to "contracts,"
what is the basis of liability? It is tort, not so? In this subset I would
make the seller liable only if the buyer could show that he bought in
reliance on the representation or promise or, in the case of post-
contract assurances, that he relied to his detriment. My cases show
that an articulate minority of courts use reliance in just this way under
current law.51 The cases suggest that there is a much larger group of
silent courts who may share the view that reliance is or should be a
condition to recovery (these are courts that are at pains to show
reliance even where they do not state it to be a requirement for
recovery).52
My plea is twofold. First, my cases show that not all warranty
claims are the same; some are contract plain and simple; some are
special and some really are tort or, in the words of Williston, quasi-
tort.53 I believe that the law will be more certain, more predictable,
and subject to smaller manipulation if we unbundle these liabilities.
Second, I believe that having unbundled the liabilities, we will achieve
greater certainty by freeing warranty's tortious soul and, at least in my
third subset, by insisting on reliance as a basis for recovery. Consider
the following first attempt to modify revised 2-403:
Express Warranty
A representation or promise that relates to the goods and is part
of the contract is an express warranty and is enforceable as a term in
the contract.
A representation or promise that relates to the goods and is
contained in a written owner's manual, on a label attached to the goods
or otherwise in a record delivered with the goods is an express
warranty and is enforceable as though it were part of the contract
between the buyer and seller.
A representation or promise that relates to the goods and is
neither part of the contract nor delivered in a record with the goods is
enforceable as though it were part of the contract between the buyer
and seller only if i) the buyer purchased in reliance on it or, ii) in the
case of a representation or promise made after the purchase, the buyer
changed its position in reliance on the representation or promise.
51. See supra note 27.
52. See, e.g., Downs v. Shouse, 501 E2d 401 (Ariz. App. Ct. 1972); Goodwin v.
Durant Bank & Trust, 1998 WL 20821; Bigelow v. Agway, Inc., 506 E2d 551 (2d Cir. 1974);
Hawkins Const. Co. v. Matthews Co., Inc. 209 N.W.2d 643 (Neb. 1973); & Larutan Corp. v.
Magnolia Homes Mfg. Co. of Neb., 209 N.W.2d 177 (Neb. 1973).
53. See WRIISTON, supra note 1, at 251.
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What do you think?
VI. CONCLUSION
Llewellyn's attempt to repress the tortious soul of express
warranty was not successful. And Speidel's plan to stretch contract to
cover events remote in time, place, and medium from what we
recognize as the "contract" will not be successful either. My cases
show that there is an irrepressible minimum of tort buried in express
warranty; we should let it out.
Whether Professor Honnold's more determined attempt to turn
all of express warranty into contract in article 35 of the CISG will be
successful remains to be seen. We have no cases. Because the CISG
does not apply to consumer transactions and because it applies
exclusively to international business transactions where there will
usually be an extensive written contract that is intended to include all
of the terms, perhaps that law properly eliminates liability that might
arise from advertising brochures or from post-sale communications
between the parties.
But what was open to Honnold in an international code written
from scratch is not open to Speidel in a carefully watched revision of a
domestic law that drags a tail of dozens of cases. I believe that the
revisers of Article 2 correctly make the seller liable for the accuracy of
certain promises and statements that do not fit comfortably into the
definition of contract. I disagree with the current draft revision for two
reasons. First, it unnecessarily distorts the idea of contract in its
attempt to put liability on sellers for their inaccurate statements and
unfulfilled assurances. Second, this distortion of contract may include
some cases that should not cause liability and exclude others where
there should be warranty liability.
In my opinion, it would make the law more certain and far more
felicitous to abandon Llewellyn's belief that all express warranty is
and must be contract. Of course the revisers have already done that
with express warranties to remote buyers,54 but they should do the
same with certain statements made to immediate buyers too. In my
opinion, the universe of appropriate liability is captured by three sets:
contract, pre- and post-contract statements on which the buyer relies,
and certain post-sale statements that are entitled to special status
because of their particular association with the product sold and
because of their specific direction to the actual buyer.
54. See Draft of March 1, 1998, § 2-408.
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